



COMISIÓN EUROPEA – COMUNICADO DE PRENSA

Previsiones de otoño para 2011-13: Parón del crecimiento

Bruselas, 10 de noviembre de 2011 – La recuperación económica de la UE se ha interrumpido. El grave deterioro de la confianza está afectando a la inversión y al consumo, al tiempo que el debilitamiento del crecimiento global frena las exportaciones y el apremiante saneamiento presupuestario laстра la demanda interior. Se prevé ahora que el PIB en la UE se estanque hasta bien entrado 2012. El crecimiento para todo el año 2012 debería situarse en torno a un 0,5 %. En 2013 se espera una lenta recuperación del crecimiento de aproximadamente un 1,5 %. No es probable que los mercados laborales registren una auténtica mejora, y se prevé que el desempleo se mantenga en el elevado nivel actual, que ronda el 9,5 %. La inflación debería volver a situarse en niveles inferiores al 2 % en los próximos trimestres. Está previsto que se afiance el saneamiento presupuestario, con un descenso de los déficits públicos hasta un nivel ligeramente superior al 3 % en 2013, aplicando la hipótesis de mantenimiento de las políticas actuales.

Olli Rehn, Vicepresidente de la Comisión responsable de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios, ha declarado lo siguiente: «*El crecimiento en Europa se ha estancado y existe el riesgo de una nueva recesión. Aunque la creación de empleo esté aumentando en algunos Estados miembros, no se prevé una auténtica mejora del desempleo en la UE en su conjunto. Para lograr la reanudación del crecimiento y la creación de empleo es esencial restablecer la confianza en la viabilidad fiscal y en el sistema financiero, así como acelerar las reformas destinadas a intensificar el potencial de crecimiento de Europa. Ya existe un amplio consenso respecto de la necesidad de llevar a cabo una acción política. Ahora es preciso proceder a una ejecución rigurosa de la misma. Por mi parte, empezaré a aplicar sin dilación las nuevas normas de gobernanza económica.*».

Estancamiento del crecimiento económico

La recuperación económica se ha interrumpido. En el trimestre en curso y en los venideros se espera un estancamiento del PIB. Desde el verano, las perspectivas no han hecho sino empeorar. La crisis de la deuda soberana en los Estados miembros de la zona del euro se ha generalizado, la sostenibilidad de la deuda en las economías avanzadas no pertenecientes a la UE ha pasado a situarse en el punto de mira de los inversores y la economía mundial ha perdido impulso. Habida cuenta del empeoramiento de las perspectivas de crecimiento y de la creciente incertidumbre, es probable que las empresas aplacen o cancelen sus inversiones. Los hogares consumirán con prudencia y, en algunos Estados miembros, deberán tratar de reducir en mayor medida su elevado nivel de endeudamiento. Por otro lado, es probable que los bancos restrinjan el crédito, contribuyendo así a limitar las perspectivas de inversión y consumo. El saneamiento presupuestario ha ido cobrando urgencia a medida que la preocupación respecto de la sostenibilidad de la deuda se iba agudizando y extendiendo a países que hasta el momento no se habían visto afectados por el problema. El debilitamiento de la economía real, la fragilidad de las finanzas públicas y la vulnerabilidad del sector financiero parecen estar agravándose recíprocamente, dando lugar a un círculo vicioso. La confianza y el crecimiento sólo podrán recuperarse una vez que se logre romper esa dinámica negativa.

Se espera que, aplicadas de forma combinada, las medidas políticas decididas en los últimos meses resulten efectivas y logren reducir, hacia mediados de 2012, la incertidumbre que generan la deuda soberana y la crisis del mercado financiero, y que de esta forma se vayan activando gradualmente la inversión y el consumo que han quedado aplazados. Se prevé que el crecimiento anual del PIB en 2012 sea del 0,6 % en el conjunto de la UE y del 0,5 % en la zona del euro. En cuanto a 2013, se espera que ese crecimiento sea del 1,5% en la UE en su conjunto y del 1,3% en la zona del euro. Ningún grupo de Estados miembros estará a salvo de la ralentización prevista, aunque persistirán las diferencias en cuanto al nivel de crecimiento.

Un crecimiento insuficiente para mejorar la situación del mercado laboral

En 2012 se prevé la total paralización del crecimiento del empleo. La recuperación del crecimiento del PIB que se esbozará durante el segundo semestre del próximo año será demasiado moderada para provocar algún resultado digno de reseñar por lo que respecta a la evolución del mercado laboral. No parece que el desempleo vaya a disminuir durante el periodo a que se refiere la previsión. Los mercados laborales de los distintos Estados miembros seguirá registrando situaciones muy dispares.

Mejora gradual de las finanzas públicas

El año 2011 ha marcado el paso de la estabilización al saneamiento de las finanzas públicas. Las previsiones de déficit presupuestario para 2011 se sitúan ahora en el 4,7 % del PIB en la UE en su conjunto y en el 4,1 % en la zona del euro. Para 2012, se sitúan en el 3,9 % en la UE en su conjunto y en el 3,4 % en la zona del euro. En estas previsiones no se tienen en cuenta las medidas de saneamiento adicionales proyectadas pero que aún no se han llegado a ejecutar. Esta hipótesis técnica de mantenimiento de las políticas actuales puede tener un mayor peso del habitual en las previsiones. Con arreglo a esta hipótesis, se prevé que en la UE el ratio deuda/PIB agregado alcance una cota máxima del 85 %, aproximadamente, en 2012 y pase a estabilizarse en 2013. En la zona del euro se espera que el ratio deuda/PIB continúe incrementándose ligeramente a lo largo del periodo cubierto por las previsiones, superando el 90 % en 2012.

Reducción de la inflación

Los precios de la energía han sido la causa principal de la inflación en 2011. Dado que se espera una disminución gradual de los mismos, la inflación global debería volver a descender hasta niveles inferiores al 2 % en 2012. La persistente ralentización de la economía seguirá conteniendo las presiones subyacentes sobre los precios, mientras que los salarios sólo registrarán un crecimiento moderado.

Riesgos que ensombrecen aún más las previsiones

Habida cuenta del exiguo crecimiento del PIB previsto con arreglo a la hipótesis de base, existe un riesgo no desdeñable de recesión. Los principales riesgos se derivan de la preocupación que suscitan la deuda soberana, el sector financiero y el comercio mundial. Es posible que se cree una dinámica de interacción negativa en virtud de la cual la ralentización del crecimiento afecte a los deudores de deuda soberana y que la debilidad de estos últimos repercuta, a su vez, en la salud del sector financiero.

En cuanto a los elementos positivos, cabe la posibilidad de que el restablecimiento de la confianza sea más rápido de lo esperado, lo que puede hacer que la recuperación del consumo privado y de la inversión se produzcan antes de lo previsto. El crecimiento mundial podría resultar más resistente de lo esperado en la hipótesis de base y contribuir al apoyo de las exportaciones netas de la UE. Por último, una disminución mayor del precio de las materias primas podría potenciar los ingresos reales y el consumo.

Los riesgos que pesan sobre la inflación parecen globalmente equilibrados.

El informe completo se encuentra disponible en la siguiente dirección:

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2011_autumn_forecast_en.htm

AUTUMN 2011 FORECASTS

MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2013

(a) GDP at constant prices (annual% change)

	5-year average						Estimate	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	2013
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-04	2007	2008	2009	2010			
BE	1,3	2,7	2,0	2,9	1,0	-2,8	2,3	2,2	0,9	1,3
DE	1,2	2,0	1,0	3,3	1,1	-3,1	3,7	2,9	0,8	1,3
EE	-	7,0	8,4	7,5	-3,7	-14,3	2,3	8,0	3,2	4,0
IE	4,5	8,3	5,0	5,2	-3,0	-7,0	-0,4	1,1	1,1	2,3
EL	1,1	3,8	4,3	3,0	-0,2	-3,2	-3,5	-5,5	-2,8	0,7
ES	1,5	4,4	3,3	3,5	0,9	-3,7	-0,1	0,7	0,7	1,4
FR	1,2	2,9	1,7	2,3	-0,1	-2,7	1,5	1,4	0,4	1,4
IT	1,2	2,1	1,0	1,7	-1,2	-3,1	1,5	0,3	0,1	0,7
CY	3,5	4,2	3,2	5,1	3,4	-1,9	1,1	0,3	0,0	1,8
LU	2,4	6,3	4,1	4,4	0,8	-5,3	2,7	1,4	1,0	2,3
MT	5,0	3,4	1,7	4,3	4,4	-2,7	2,7	2,1	1,3	2,0
NL	2,5	3,7	1,4	3,9	1,8	-3,5	1,7	1,8	0,5	1,3
AT	1,9	2,8	2,2	3,7	1,4	-3,8	2,3	2,9	0,9	1,9
PT	2,0	3,9	0,7	2,4	0,0	-2,5	1,4	1,9	-3,0	1,1
SI	2,0	4,2	4,2	4,9	3,4	-8,0	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,5
SK	-	2,7	5,9	10,5	5,9	4,9	4,2	2,9	1,1	2,9
FI	1,3	4,5	3,1	5,3	1,0	-8,2	3,4	3,1	1,4	1,7
E unta	1,3	2,8	1,8	3,0	0,4	-4,2	1,9	1,3	0,5	1,3
BG	-2,8	2,5	4,0	4,4	4,2	-3,5	0,2	2,2	2,3	3,0
CZ	2,4	4,4	4,9	3,7	3,1	4,7	2,7	1,8	0,7	1,7
DK	2,4	2,4	1,8	1,4	-1,1	-5,2	1,7	1,2	1,4	1,7
LV	-8,8	4,0	9,0	9,4	-3,3	-17,7	-0,3	4,5	2,5	4,0
LI	-8,3	4,7	8,0	9,8	2,9	-14,8	1,4	1,1	3,4	3,8
HU	0,4	3,7	4,2	0,1	0,9	-4,8	1,3	1,4	0,5	1,4
PL	4,9	4,4	4,1	4,8	5,1	1,4	3,9	4,0	2,5	2,8
RO	1,3	0,1	4,2	4,3	7,3	-4,4	-1,9	1,7	2,1	3,4
SE	1,2	3,4	3,3	3,3	-0,4	-5,2	3,4	4,0	1,4	2,1
UK	2,5	3,7	2,8	3,5	-1,1	4,4	1,8	0,7	0,4	1,3
EU	1,3	3,0	2,1	3,2	0,3	4,2	2,0	1,4	0,4	1,3
US	3,3	3,8	2,7	1,9	-0,4	-3,5	3,0	1,4	1,3	1,3
JP	1,3	0,5	1,7	1,4	-1,2	-4,3	4,0	-0,4	1,8	1,0

(b) Gross fixed capital formation in equipment (annual% change)

	5-year average						Estimate	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	2013
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-04	2007	2008	2009	2010			
BE	-0,9	4,9	1,1	9,3	3,3	-11,4	-2,7	4,9	1,4	1,3
DE	-3,2	4,4	2,7	10,3	3,8	-22,8	10,0	10,1	3,5	7,1
EE	-	13,9	14,4	12,1	-17,9	-50,2	24,1	23,0	3,0	14,0
IE	9,3	9,1	4,3	17,9	-12,4	-23,5	-14,9	8,3	15,0	8,0
EL	7,4	10,9	10,0	37,0	1,3	-24,0	-20,0	-13,4	-3,3	4,8
ES	-0,1	8,9	4,3	9,4	-3,2	-22,9	3,2	-0,3	0,9	1,4
FR	0,8	7,4	1,1	9,1	3,3	-9,4	4,1	9,1	1,2	5,8
IT	0,1	4,5	1,4	3,2	-5,2	-14,2	11,4	2,0	-1,8	2,2
CY	-	5,0	5,1	11,9	12,7	-9,3	-12,0	-8,0	5,0	1,0
LU	4,3	10,9	3,4	25,4	3,8	-32,9	24,9	18,3	-8,0	-4,0
MT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	MT
NL	4,7	4,0	1,9	8,3	7,1	-13,3	7,3	8,8	-1,9	5,4
AT	0,0	3,0	0,4	1,4	-0,7	-9,7	4,3	8,3	0,9	4,7
PT	1,3	9,2	-0,1	7,9	4,9	-13,2	-4,3	-11,3	-8,0	1,7
SI	9,4	11,7	8,7	9,2	3,1	-28,9	4,4	3,4	2,8	5,0
SK	-	1,8	4,4	4,3	1,2	-24,4	1,4	5,3	-4,4	4,0
FI	1,0	4,0	-1,3	17,8	1,3	-12,0	-6,4	7,0	1,0	3,0
E unta	0,1	4,8	2,3	9,4	1,1	-17,1	3,9	5,8	0,9	4,1
BG	-	-	12,3	28,8	2,9	-43,1	-18,4	-	-	BG
CZ	14,2	4,8	3,4	23,0	10,3	-18,3	-1,3	3,0	-1,0	3,0
DK	3,4	4,2	3,8	4,9	-3,5	-13,2	2,7	-7,5	8,9	4,5
LV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	LV
LI	-	13,5	15,1	23,4	-17,3	-50,0	19,4	45,0	15,0	15,0
HU	-	10,0	4,1	11,4	1,4	-14,7	-4,2	0,0	1,0	4,3
PL	-	7,1	4,8	22,3	13,0	-10,8	-3,1	3,3	1,1	8,7
RO	7,3	5,9	14,9	28,3	10,9	-32,7	-2,0	4,5	2,3	7,5
SE	5,1	4,1	5,1	12,9	5,3	-23,5	11,7	8,0	2,5	4,0
UK	4,3	8,0	2,4	12,3	-3,2	-22,0	8,4	-5,7	3,4	4,1
EU	-	4,9	4,3	12,8	2,1	-19,8	4,8	4,1	1,7	5,4
US	10,0	8,2	4,4	2,9	-5,3	-18,4	17,3	7,1	4,4	5,3
JP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	JP

Note - As usual, the forecasts are conditioned upon, inter alia, the technical assumption of 'no policy change'.

This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed and not taken into account. As a result, projections for 2011 are substantially an extrapolation of present trends.

AUTUMN 2011 FORECASTS

MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2013

(c) Total employment (annual % change)

	5-year average						Estimates	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-06	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
BE	0.1	1.4	0.7	1.4	1.8	-0.2	0.8	1.2	0.4	0.5
DE	-0.5	0.9	-0.1	1.7	1.2	0.0	0.5	1.3	0.4	0.2
EE	-5.2	-1.4	2.0	0.8	0.2	-10.0	-4.8	5.9	1.2	1.2
IE	2.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	-1.1	-8.1	-4.2	-1.9	-0.4	0.4
EL	0.9	0.7	1.7	1.4	0.8	-0.2	-1.9	-5.7	-2.8	0.4
ES	-0.3	4.2	2.9	3.0	-0.2	-4.5	-2.4	-1.0	-0.4	0.5
FR	-0.4	1.7	0.4	1.4	0.7	-1.4	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4
IT	-0.9	1.1	0.8	1.0	-0.4	-2.9	-0.7	0.3	-0.2	0.3
CY	-	1.6	3.0	3.2	1.8	-0.7	-0.3	-1.0	-0.2	0.4
LU	2.3	4.7	2.7	4.5	4.7	1.0	1.8	2.9	1.7	2.2
MI	1.3	0.8	0.7	3.2	2.4	-0.3	2.3	1.0	0.8	1.4
NL	1.0	2.4	-0.2	2.2	1.5	-1.1	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1	0.0
AT	-0.7	0.4	0.5	1.7	1.8	-1.3	0.4	1.4	0.2	0.8
PL	-0.8	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.5	-2.4	-1.5	-1.1	-1.4	0.2
SI	-	0.3	0.5	3.3	2.4	-1.8	-2.5	-0.7	-0.1	0.2
SK	-	-1.1	0.9	2.1	2.9	-2.5	-1.4	1.4	0.1	1.1
FI	-2.3	2.2	0.9	2.2	2.4	-3.5	-1.4	1.0	0.3	0.2
E amea	-0.4	1.4	0.7	1.7	0.7	-2.1	-0.3	0.3	0.0	0.3
BG	-	-2.3	2.4	3.2	2.4	-2.4	-5.9	-3.1	0.1	0.9
CZ	-	-1.2	0.4	2.1	2.3	-1.2	-1.7	0.8	-0.1	0.3
DK	0.1	1.0	0.3	2.8	1.9	-3.1	-2.1	0.3	0.3	DK
LV	-7.4	0.0	2.5	3.4	0.9	-13.2	-4.8	2.2	0.7	1.3
LI	-2.7	-2.1	2.0	2.8	-0.7	-4.8	-5.1	3.5	2.0	1.9
HU	-	1.0	-0.2	0.3	-1.3	-2.8	0.2	0.5	1.1	0.0
PL	-	-1.1	0.4	4.5	3.9	0.4	0.5	1.0	0.2	0.4
RO	-2.8	-2.3	-2.4	0.4	0.0	-1.8	-1.8	0.1	0.4	RO
SE	-1.9	1.4	0.1	2.3	0.9	-2.0	1.1	2.2	0.2	0.4
UK	0.0	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.7	-1.4	0.2	0.9	0.3	0.5
EU	-	0.9	0.4	1.7	0.9	-1.9	-0.4	0.4	0.1	0.4
US	1.8	1.7	0.7	0.9	-0.7	-3.0	-0.4	0.4	0.4	0.7
JP	0.4	-0.6	-0.2	0.4	-0.3	-1.5	-0.4	-0.2	0.1	0.1
E amea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(d) Number of unemployed (% of the labour force)

	5-year average						Estimates	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-06	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
BE	8.9	8.1	8.2	7.5	7.0	7.9	8.3	7.4	7.7	7.9
DE	7.8	8.4	9.8	8.7	7.5	7.8	7.1	6.1	5.9	5.8
EE	-	11.3	8.8	4.7	5.5	13.8	14.9	12.5	11.2	10.1
IE	13.9	4.2	4.5	4.4	4.3	11.9	13.7	14.4	14.3	13.4
EL	8.8	10.9	9.9	8.3	7.7	9.5	12.4	14.4	18.4	18.4
ES	17.8	13.1	10.1	8.3	11.3	18.0	20.1	20.9	20.9	20.3
FR	11.0	10.0	9.1	8.4	7.8	9.5	9.8	9.8	10.0	10.1
IT	10.3	10.3	7.9	4.1	4.7	7.8	8.4	8.1	8.2	8.2
CY	-	3.8	4.4	3.9	3.7	5.3	4.2	7.2	7.5	7.1
LU	1.7	2.4	4.1	4.2	4.9	5.1	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.7
MI	5.2	4.8	7.3	4.5	4.0	4.9	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.4
NL	4.0	3.8	4.4	3.4	3.1	3.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.8
AT	3.9	4.0	4.7	4.4	3.8	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.2
PL	4.2	5.3	7.3	8.9	8.3	10.4	12.0	12.4	13.4	13.7
SI	-	4.9	4.4	4.9	4.4	5.9	7.3	8.2	8.4	8.2
SK	-	15.8	14.8	11.1	9.5	12.0	14.4	13.2	13.2	12.3
FI	14.9	10.4	8.1	4.9	4.4	8.2	8.4	7.8	7.7	7.4
E amea	10.1	9.3	8.8	7.4	7.4	9.4	10.1	10.0	10.1	10.0
BG	-	13.7	12.4	1.9	5.4	4.8	10.2	12.2	12.1	11.3
CZ	-	7.3	7.7	5.3	4.4	4.7	7.3	4.8	7.0	4.7
DK	7.8	4.8	4.8	3.8	3.3	4.0	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.1
LV	13.8	14.0	9.8	4.0	7.5	17.1	18.7	14.1	15.0	13.5
LI	5.0	13.3	10.3	4.3	5.8	13.7	17.8	15.1	13.3	11.4
HU	-	7.3	4.5	7.4	7.8	10.0	11.2	11.2	11.0	11.3
PL	13.4	13.8	18.1	9.4	7.1	8.2	9.4	9.3	9.2	8.4
RO	5.8	4.1	7.4	4.4	5.8	4.9	7.3	8.2	7.8	7.4
SE	8.5	7.2	7.0	4.1	4.2	8.3	8.4	7.4	7.3	SE
UK	9.1	3.8	5.0	5.3	5.4	7.4	7.8	7.9	8.4	8.3
EU	-	8.8	8.9	7.2	7.1	9.0	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.4
US	4.3	4.3	5.4	4.4	3.8	9.3	9.4	9.0	9.0	8.8
JP	2.8	4.4	4.8	3.9	4.0	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.7
E amea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: - As usual, the forecasts are conditioned upon, inter alia, the technical assumption of 'no policy change'.

This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed and not taken into account, do not result in a revision of projections for 2013 and substantially an extrapolation of previous trends.

AUTUMN 2011 FORECASTS

MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2013

(e) Inflation (1)(annual % change)

	5-year average							Estimates	Forecasts	Assumption unchanged policies	
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-04	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
BE	1.8	1.7	2.0	1.8	4.5	0.0	2.3	3.5	2.0	1.9	BE
DE	2.4	1.2	1.4	2.3	2.8	0.2	1.2	2.4	1.7	1.8	DE
EE	-	4.1	3.3	4.7	10.4	0.2	2.7	5.2	3.3	2.8	EE
IE	2.5	3.0	3.2	2.9	3.1	-1.7	-1.4	1.1	0.7	1.2	IE
EL	11.4	3.7	3.4	3.0	4.2	1.3	4.7	3.0	0.8	0.8	EL
ES	4.9	2.4	3.3	2.8	4.1	-0.2	2.0	3.0	1.1	1.3	ES
FR	1.4	1.2	2.1	1.4	3.2	0.1	1.7	2.2	1.5	1.4	FR
IT	5.1	2.1	2.4	2.0	3.5	0.8	1.4	2.7	2.0	1.9	IT
CY	-	2.7	2.4	2.2	4.4	0.2	2.4	3.4	2.8	2.3	CY
LU	2.8	1.9	2.9	2.7	4.1	0.0	2.8	3.4	2.1	2.5	LU
MI	-	3.1	2.3	0.7	4.7	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.3	MI
NL	2.4	2.6	2.1	1.4	2.2	1.0	0.9	2.5	1.9	1.3	NL
AT	2.5	1.3	1.7	2.2	3.2	0.4	1.7	3.4	2.2	2.1	AT
PT	5.4	2.7	2.9	2.4	2.7	-0.9	1.4	3.5	3.0	1.5	PT
SI	45.8	8.0	4.3	3.8	5.5	0.9	2.1	1.9	1.3	1.2	SI
SK	-	8.5	5.3	1.9	3.9	0.9	0.7	4.0	1.7	2.1	SK
FI	1.9	1.9	1.1	1.4	3.9	1.4	1.7	3.2	2.4	1.8	FI
€ area	3.4	1.8	2.1	2.1	3.3	0.3	1.4	2.4	1.7	1.4	€ area
BG	80.5	-	5.5	7.4	12.0	2.5	3.0	3.4	3.1	3.0	BG
CZ	11.2	5.6	1.5	3.0	4.3	0.4	1.2	1.8	2.7	1.4	CZ
DK	1.7	2.1	1.8	1.7	3.4	1.1	2.2	2.4	1.7	1.8	DK
LV	-	3.9	4.9	10.1	15.3	3.3	-1.2	4.2	2.4	2.0	LV
LI	-	3.9	1.4	5.8	11.1	4.2	1.2	4.0	2.7	2.8	LI
HU	-	11.3	4.8	7.9	4.0	4.0	4.7	4.0	4.5	4.1	HU
PL	31.4	9.8	1.9	2.4	4.2	4.0	2.7	3.7	2.7	2.9	PL
RO	118.0	13.2	12.9	4.9	7.9	5.4	4.1	3.9	3.4	3.4	RO
SE	3.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	3.3	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.4	SE
UK	3.4	1.3	1.7	2.3	3.4	2.2	3.3	4.3	2.9	2.0	UK
EU	24.7	4.5	2.3	2.4	3.7	1.0	2.1	3.0	2.0	1.8	EU
US	2.3	1.8	2.3	2.7	3.3	0.2	1.8	2.4	1.7	1.4	US
JP	0.4	-0.3	-0.8	-0.4	0.4	-2.1	-1.5	-0.5	0.5	0.0	JP

(i) Consumer prices (Harmonised Index) from 1995 onwards for the EU, deflator of private consumption otherwise.

(f) Current account balance (as a % of GDP)

	5-year average							Estimates	Forecasts	Assumption unchanged policies	
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-04	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
BE	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.9	1.1	0.7	3.2	2.4	2.1	2.4	BE
DE	-1.0	-0.9	4.0	7.5	4.2	5.8	5.8	5.1	4.4	4.2	DE
EE	-	-7.4	-11.8	-15.7	-9.1	4.4	3.8	3.1	1.3	0.7	EE
IE	2.4	1.0	-1.3	-5.3	-5.4	-2.9	0.5	0.7	1.3	1.8	IE
EL	-0.5	-4.7	-11.9	-14.9	-17.9	-14.3	-12.3	-9.9	-7.9	-4.9	EL
ES	-1.4	-2.4	-4.0	-10.0	-9.4	-5.1	-4.5	-3.4	-3.0	-3.0	ES
FR	0.7	2.2	0.0	-1.4	-1.9	-2.1	-2.2	-3.2	-3.3	-3.0	FR
IT	1.0	1.2	-0.8	-1.3	-2.9	-2.0	-3.5	-3.4	-3.0	-2.3	IT
CY	-	-1.3	-5.0	-11.7	-11.9	-10.4	-9.0	-7.3	-4.7	-4.1	CY
LU	12.8	10.0	10.5	10.1	5.3	7.0	8.1	5.3	3.4	2.9	LU
MI	-	-4.3	-5.0	-4.3	-5.1	-7.3	-4.0	-3.1	-2.9	-2.4	MI
NL	4.4	4.8	7.5	8.4	4.7	2.9	5.1	5.5	7.0	4.9	NL
AT	-2.3	-1.4	2.4	4.0	4.9	3.0	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.9	AT
PI	-5.5	-8.8	-8.9	-10.2	-12.4	-10.8	-9.7	-7.4	-5.0	-3.8	PI
SI	2.3	-1.7	-1.3	-4.3	-7.0	-1.3	-0.8	0.1	0.3	0.5	SI
SK	-	-4.5	-7.5	-5.4	-4.3	-3.4	-3.4	-0.7	-1.2	-1.9	SK
FI	0.1	4.4	5.1	4.2	3.2	2.7	2.8	-0.1	0.0	0.1	FI
€ area	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	-0.7	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.2	€ area
BG	4.3	-2.3	-8.7	-23.2	-23.2	-9.0	-1.0	1.4	1.4	0.9	BG
CZ	-1.9	-3.4	-3.8	-5.1	-2.9	-3.4	-4.4	-3.4	-3.2	-3.5	CZ
DK	1.8	1.2	3.3	1.4	2.7	3.4	5.2	4.3	5.8	5.4	DK
LV	4.0	-7.3	-12.4	-22.4	-13.1	8.4	3.0	-0.4	-1.1	-2.0	LV
LI	-	-8.4	-7.3	-15.0	-13.0	2.8	1.1	-1.7	-1.9	-2.3	LI
HU	-	-4.3	-8.1	-7.4	-4.9	-0.2	1.0	1.7	3.2	3.8	HU
PL	0.3	-4.8	-3.4	-4.2	-4.4	-3.9	-4.4	-5.0	-4.3	-4.8	PL
RO	-	-5.4	-4.3	-13.4	-11.4	4.2	-4.2	-4.1	-5.0	-5.3	RO
SE	1.2	4.7	4.7	8.4	6.8	4.8	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.4	SE
UK	-1.4	-1.5	-2.3	-2.4	-1.8	-1.4	-2.5	-2.5	-0.9	-0.2	UK
EU	-0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.4	-1.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	0.0	0.2	EU
US	-2.4	-2.1	-4.7	-5.0	-4.8	-3.3	-3.3	-3.3	-3.1	-3.5	US
JP	2.4	2.5	3.5	4.8	3.2	2.8	3.3	2.9	2.9	2.8	JP

Note: - As usual, the forecasts are conditional upon, inter alia, the technical assumption of no policy change.

This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed and not taken into account. As a result, projections for 2013 are essentially extrapolation of present trends.

AUTUMN 2011 FORECASTS

MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2013

(g) General government net lending (+) or borrowing (-) (* a % of GDP) (1)

	5-year average							Estimate	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	2013
	1992-94	1997-01	2002-04	2007	2008	2009	2010				
BE	-5.4	-0.7	-0.6	-0.3	-1.3	-5.8	-4.1	-3.4	-4.4	-4.5	BE
DE	-3.0	-1.7	-3.3	0.2	-0.1	-3.2	-4.3	-1.3	-1.0	-0.7	DE
EE	-	-0.5	1.5	2.4	-2.9	-2.0	0.2	0.8	-1.8	-0.8	EE
IE	-1.7	2.4	1.2	0.1	-7.3	-14.2	-31.3	-10.3	-8.4	-7.8	IE
EL	-9.7	-4.2	-5.9	-4.3	-9.8	-13.8	-10.4	-8.9	-7.0	-4.8	EL
ES	-5.8	-1.9	0.4	1.9	-4.3	-11.2	-9.3	-4.4	-5.9	-5.3	ES
FR	-4.9	-2.2	-3.2	-2.7	-3.3	-7.5	-7.1	-5.8	-5.3	-5.1	FR
IT	-8.3	-2.3	-3.4	-1.4	-2.7	-5.4	-4.4	-4.0	-2.3	-1.2	IT
CY	-	-3.4	-3.7	3.5	0.9	-6.1	-5.3	-4.7	-4.9	-4.7	CY
LU	1.4	4.5	0.4	3.7	3.0	-0.9	-1.1	-0.4	-1.1	-0.9	LU
MT	-	-7.5	-5.1	-2.4	-4.4	-3.7	-3.4	-3.0	-3.5	-3.4	MT
NL	-3.3	0.0	-1.3	0.2	0.5	-5.4	-5.1	4.3	-3.1	-2.7	NL
AT	4.1	-1.4	-2.0	-0.9	-0.9	-4.1	-4.4	-3.4	-3.1	-2.9	AT
PT	4.4	-3.3	-3.9	-3.1	-3.4	-10.1	-9.8	-5.8	-4.5	-3.2	PT
SI	-	-3.1	-2.0	0.0	-1.9	-4.1	-3.8	-3.7	-3.3	-3.7	SI
SK	-	-7.4	-3.9	-1.8	-2.1	-8.0	-7.7	-5.8	-4.9	-5.0	SK
FI	-5.8	2.7	3.1	5.3	4.3	-2.5	-2.5	-1.0	-0.7	-0.7	FI
€ area	-5.0	-1.7	-2.5	-0.7	-2.1	-4.4	-4.2	-4.1	-3.4	-3.0	€ area
BG	-	0.5	0.4	1.2	1.7	4.3	-3.1	-2.5	-1.7	-1.3	BG
CZ	-	-4.2	-4.3	-0.7	-2.2	-3.8	-4.8	-4.1	-3.8	-4.0	CZ
DK	-2.5	0.9	2.4	4.8	3.2	-2.7	-2.4	-4.0	-4.5	-2.1	DK
LV	-	-1.4	-1.2	-0.4	-4.2	-9.7	-8.3	-4.2	-3.3	-3.2	LV
LI	-	-4.8	-1.1	-1.0	-3.3	-9.5	-7.0	-5.0	-3.0	-3.4	LI
HU	-	-5.3	-8.0	-5.1	-3.7	-4.4	-4.2	-3.4	-2.8	-3.7	HU
PL	-	-3.9	-4.9	-1.9	-3.7	-7.3	-7.8	-5.4	-4.0	-3.1	PL
RO	-	-4.0	-1.4	-2.9	-5.7	-9.0	-4.9	-4.9	-3.7	-2.9	RO
SE	-7.7	1.0	0.4	3.4	2.2	-0.7	0.2	0.9	0.7	0.9	SE
UK	-4.1	0.5	-3.0	-2.7	-5.0	-11.5	-10.3	-9.4	-7.8	-5.8	UK
EU	-	-1.4	-2.3	-0.9	-2.4	-4.9	-4.4	-4.7	-3.9	-3.2	EU
US	-4.2	0.3	-3.7	-2.8	-4.4	-11.5	-10.1	-10.0	-8.3	-5.0	US
JP	-2.5	-7.3	-4.1	-2.4	-2.2	-8.7	-6.8	-7.2	-7.4	-7.2	JP

(i) The net lending (borrowing) includes in 2000-2003 end-of-period related to LHM TS balances.

(h) General government gross debt (* a % of GDP)

	2004							Estimate	Forecast	Assumption unchanged policies	2013
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011				
BE	94.0	92.0	88.0	84.1	89.3	91.9	94.2	97.2	99.2	100.3	BE
DE	44.2	48.5	47.9	45.2	44.7	74.4	83.2	81.7	81.2	79.9	DE
EE	5.0	4.4	4.4	3.7	4.5	7.2	4.7	5.8	4.0	4.1	EE
IE	29.4	27.2	24.7	24.9	44.3	45.2	94.9	108.1	117.5	121.1	IE
EL	99.8	101.2	107.3	107.4	113.0	129.3	144.9	142.8	158.3	158.5	EL
ES	44.2	43.0	39.5	34.2	40.1	33.8	41.0	49.4	73.8	78.0	ES
FR	43.0	44.7	44.0	44.2	48.2	79.0	82.3	83.4	89.2	91.7	FR
IT	103.4	103.4	104.1	103.1	103.8	113.5	118.4	120.5	120.5	118.7	IT
CY	70.9	49.4	44.7	38.8	48.9	38.5	41.5	44.9	48.4	70.9	CY
LU	4.3	4.1	4.7	4.7	13.7	14.8	19.1	19.3	20.2	20.3	LU
MT	71.7	49.7	44.1	42.1	42.2	47.8	49.0	49.4	70.8	71.5	MT
NL	52.4	51.8	47.4	45.3	36.5	40.8	42.9	44.2	44.9	44.0	NL
AT	44.7	44.2	42.3	40.2	43.8	49.5	71.8	72.2	73.3	73.7	AT
PI	57.4	42.8	43.9	48.3	71.4	83.0	93.3	101.4	111.0	112.1	PI
SI	27.3	24.7	24.4	23.1	21.9	33.3	38.8	45.5	50.1	54.4	SI
SK	41.3	34.2	30.5	29.4	27.8	33.5	41.0	44.3	47.5	51.1	SK
FI	44.4	41.7	39.4	33.2	33.9	43.3	48.3	49.1	51.8	53.5	FI
€ area	49.4	70.2	48.5	44.3	70.1	79.8	83.4	88.0	90.4	90.9	€ area
BG	37.0	27.3	21.4	17.2	13.7	14.4	14.3	17.3	18.3	18.3	BG
CZ	28.9	28.4	28.3	27.9	28.7	34.4	37.4	39.9	41.9	44.0	CZ
DK	45.1	37.8	32.1	27.3	34.5	41.8	43.7	44.1	44.4	44.8	DK
LV	15.0	12.5	10.7	9.0	19.8	34.7	44.7	44.8	45.1	47.1	LV
LI	19.3	18.3	17.9	14.8	15.5	29.4	38.0	37.7	38.5	39.4	LI
HU	59.1	41.7	45.9	47.0	72.9	79.7	81.3	75.9	74.3	74.7	HU
PL	43.7	47.1	47.7	45.0	47.1	50.9	54.9	54.7	57.1	57.5	PL
RO	18.7	15.8	12.4	12.8	13.4	23.4	31.0	34.0	33.8	33.9	RO
SE	50.3	50.4	45.0	40.2	36.8	42.7	39.7	34.3	34.4	32.4	SE
UK	40.9	42.3	43.4	44.4	34.8	49.4	79.9	84.0	88.8	83.9	UK
EU	42.3	42.8	41.5	39.0	42.5	74.7	80.3	82.3	84.9	84.9	EU

Note - As usual, the forecasts are conditioned upon, in particular, the technical assumption of 'no policy change'.

This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed and not taken into account, do not result in a marked deviation of present trends.

Personas del contacto :

[Amadeu Altafaj Tardio](#) (+32 2 295 26 58)

[Catherine Bunyan](#) (+32 2 299 65 12)

9. SPAIN

Unwinding imbalances in a weakening external environment

Continued rebalancing with slowing growth


Real GDP is forecast to grow by around 0.7% in 2011 and 2012 and to gather some pace in 2013. Net exports should continue to support growth, with domestic demand becoming less of a drag over the forecast horizon and gaining strength from 2013 onwards. However, in interpreting these numbers it has to be kept in mind that these forecasts are significantly influenced by the technical no-policy-change assumption for 2012 and 2013. Due to general elections scheduled for 20 November 2011, the draft budget for 2012 has not been adopted yet. Therefore, in line with the usual no-policy-change assumption, the current forecast only takes into account a temporary extension of the 2011 budget into the first few months of 2012 and measures already adopted or known with sufficient detail. The fiscal consolidation efforts required in 2012 and 2013 to meet the deficit targets of 4.4% and 3% of GDP, respectively, are not yet reflected in this forecast. Taking into account these consolidation measures would significantly change the picture both for real GDP growth and for individual components.

Spain has been recovering slowly from the sharp contraction experienced in the aftermath of the reversal of the housing and credit booms. The necessary correction of large internal and external imbalances accumulated during the boom years is ongoing and will prevail for some time. The medium-term growth outlook continues to be affected by private sector deleveraging aimed at reducing the large stock of debt, fiscal consolidation needed to bring the public deficit back to a sustainable level, banking sector restructuring and record-high unemployment. Weakening global growth and heightened uncertainty related to the intensification of the euro-area sovereign-debt crisis also impinge on growth prospects. Nevertheless, on the back of resilient external demand and the progressive absorption of earlier imbalances, the recovery is expected to continue in the coming years, albeit sluggish.

A weakening external environment and heightened uncertainty compared with spring have led to a downward revision of projected economic growth in 2011 and 2012. The weaker outlook has negative consequences for the Spanish banking

sector. Despite already significant write-downs (amounting to 10% of GDP since 2008), banks still have large exposures to the real estate sector. Due to difficult funding conditions the deleveraging process has accelerated, further reducing lending to the private sector, which may have negative consequences for investment and consumption of durable goods. Bank profitability is declining and credit risk remains a concern, as non-performing loans are rising and house price adjustment is ongoing. In order to enhance the resilience of the banking system the Bank of Spain has increased minimum capital requirements, which have been already met by a vast majority of banks.

Graph II.9.1: Spain - GDP growth and contributions



Slow recovery of domestic demand

Private consumption has remained subdued in view of significant job shedding, which led to a record-high unemployment rate. In addition, households have started to reduce the large stock of debt accumulated in the run-up to the crisis. As the rebalancing process began, the saving rate jumped to close to 19% but has since declined sharply and is expected to further decrease somewhat over the forecast horizon. Under a no-policy-change assumption, private consumption is expected to increase moderately in 2012 despite wealth losses due to falling house prices. This increase will be driven by some strengthening of household incomes thanks to a weaker contraction of employment and somewhat higher wage growth (due to the assumed fading out of public sector wage cuts under a no-policy-change assumption). In addition, inflation is set to decline noticeably, thus boosting real disposable incomes. The impact of fiscal consolidation measures required to meet

fiscal targets on household incomes is not reflected in this forecast. Household deleveraging is expected to continue and will be manifested mainly in lower housing investment. All in all, households are expected to remain net lenders over the forecast horizon.

The financial situation of non-financial corporations has been improving in recent years. Their gross operating surplus has increased, partly due to a significant adjustment in employment. This allowed them to achieve a net lending position for the first time in over a decade, leading to further reductions in the stock of accumulated debt. However, average capacity utilisation is low and GDP is set to remain below its potential over the forecast horizon even though the output gap is gradually closing. Given high levels of uncertainty investment has been very weak and has been almost entirely driven by replacement investment. In 2012 low growth prospects combined with a potentially binding credit constraint may delay a stronger recovery. At the same time, the improving financial situation of enterprises and historically low interest rates should support somewhat stronger investment growth over the forecast horizon.

It is envisaged that the post-boom adjustment in residential investment will have run its course by 2013, although this process is being held back by more acute credit restriction in this sector (credit to the construction sector has been declining at a higher rate than credit to other sectors of the Spanish economy). All in all, a gradual recovery in private investment is expected in 2012 followed by some acceleration in 2013.

Exports continue to support economic growth


Exports surprised on the upside in the first half of 2011, recording a particularly strong performance in the first quarter. Robust export growth is expected to be sustained over the forecast horizon, although at a more moderate pace in line with the weaker external environment. The strength of exports stems mainly from the economic recovery of Spain's main trading partners, growing trade with emerging economies, and some improvement in the competitiveness of the Spanish economy due to declining unit labour costs.

Intermediate and capital goods have been driving the strong export performance so far and they are expected to play a key role also in the future. In

addition, services, including tourism, have also been growing strongly. In terms of geographical diversification, Spanish exports go mainly to other EU economies, but this share has been decreasing in favour of countries from outside the EU, which accounted for 40% of total exports growth in the second quarter of 2011. In addition, exports to non-EU countries have been more dynamic, recording twice the rate of growth of intra-EU exports. The robust export performance may also be explained by the presence of more competitive firms in the export sector compared to the rest of the Spanish economy. These firms tend to be larger, more productive, and characterised by lower unit labour costs. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that some firms have switched from domestic to external markets, thus increasing the export base of the Spanish economy. These latest trends are expected to continue over the forecast horizon, also in view of the recent euro depreciation. However, the pace of growth of exports of goods and services is expected to decelerate significantly to more moderate year-on-year growth rates of 4-5% for goods and around 3% for services in 2012-13.

Strong export growth combined with less dynamic imports due to weak internal demand resulted in a decrease in the trade and current-account deficits. The adjustment of the external imbalance is expected to continue, supported by the relative strength of external demand in comparison to internal demand and by some fall in oil prices.

Graph II.9.2: Spain - Net external borrowing, GDP and GNI



Employment creation delayed until 2013

Compared to spring 2011 the outlook for employment has deteriorated somewhat, driven mainly by weaker growth. Employment is expected to decline more significantly in both

2011 and 2012. In 2012, additional job shedding should put upward pressure on the unemployment rate, although this is likely to be limited by a decrease in the active population due to a sizeable net outflow of migrant workers. Since the activity rate of immigrants is one third higher than the domestic population, the impact of this outflow on the size of the active population is greater than implied by the absolute outflow.

The unemployment rate is not expected to fall below 20% over the forecast horizon. The sharp economic contraction and the still weak economic growth during the recovery, together with the ongoing structural adjustment in the construction sector, largely explain the surge in unemployment. Furthermore, rising rates of long-term unemployment also point to an increase in the structural component of unemployment.

Moderation in wage growth and inflation

Inflation is expected to decline to just above 2% by the end of 2011 and to remain relatively low over the forecast horizon. The difference between headline and core inflation is expected to be small due to more contained movements in oil prices than in the past. In addition, the differential with the euro area is expected to be negative due to weak internal demand and a lower energy bill (with Spanish prices exhibiting higher sensitivity to oil prices than the euro-area average).

Nominal wage growth moderated since autumn 2010, partly due to a wage cut in public wages in June 2010. As these effects fade out (under the no-policy-change assumption), wage growth is bound to accelerate, albeit remaining below the historical trend. Data for the first half of 2011 point to a significant negative wage drift, linked partly to a rising share of temporary workers and lower wages for newly-hired workers. Nevertheless, persistent wage rigidities prevent a more substantial adjustment of wages in an environment of very high unemployment. Nominal unit labour costs are set to increase slightly but will remain below the euro-area average over the forecast horizon, partly due to increases in productivity. This should lead to an improvement in Spain's competitive position relative to other euro-area countries.

Risks to the baseline scenario


This baseline scenario is subject to considerable risks. In particular, the fiscal consolidation

required in 2012 and 2013 to meet the deficit targets will impact on the forecast. Moreover, a more pronounced impact of credit constraints on firms and households, both in terms of cost and availability of credit, constitutes an additional downside risk. Finally, a persistently higher household saving rate due to increased uncertainty would also put negative additional pressure on private consumption.

Fiscal consolidation still needs further efforts to meet targets

The government deficit is projected to be 6.6% of GDP in 2011. This would imply a reduction of 2.7 pps. of GDP from the 9.3% of GDP recorded in 2010. The likely slippage from the 2011 target is confirmed by national accounts data for the first half of the year. This reflects in particular the fact that many autonomous communities exceeded considerably their budget deficit targets for the first half of the year. In the meantime, consolidation measures are being put in place both at regional and central level, which will have an impact in the second part of the year and contain the expected end-of-year slippage. Even further corrective action would be required to reach the deficit target this year.

The higher-than-targeted deficit in 2011 is due mainly to the emergence of a less favourable macroeconomic scenario than expected by the government. Together with the expected slippages at regional level this explains the deviation of 0.6 pp. of GDP from the 2011 official deficit target. Total revenues are set to rise by 2.3% in 2011, boosted by revenue-increasing fiscal measures in both direct and indirect taxation, such as the increases in VAT rates introduced in mid-2010, in excise duties in December 2010, changes to corporate taxation introduced in August of this year and the introduction of a wealth tax for 2011 and 2012 in September of this year. Nevertheless, total revenues are still expected to fall short relative to plans. Total expenditure is expected to decline by 3.9%, underpinned also by discretionary measures such as reductions in public investment and publicly-financed pharmaceutical expenses, a freeze in public sector wages and the phasing-out of the 0.5% of GDP 2010 stimulus package.



The 2011 deficit outcome is expected to be uneven across the different levels of government in relation to the respective targets. Whereas the central government is broadly on track to meet its target, as reflected by budgetary execution data, slippages are expected for regional governments and the social security system.

Based on the no-policy-change assumption, the budget deficit is forecast to reach 5.9% and 5.3% of GDP in 2012 and 2013 respectively. For 2012, given the delay in the budget preparation due to the general elections to be held on 20 November 2011, the 2011 budget is likely to be temporarily

extended as stated in the Constitution. Bearing this in mind, the forecast for 2012 has to be interpreted with particular caution, particularly as regards the expenditure side, for which the no-policy-change assumption has a particular relevance. Necessary consolidation measures to be included in the 2012 budget would significantly alter currently projected figures. Under the unchanged-policy assumption, an additional fiscal consolidation of 1.5 pps. of GDP in 2012 and 2.3 pps. of GDP in 2013 would be required to meet the deficit targets.

The structural balance is expected to improve from a deficit of 7% of GDP in 2010 to just below 5% of GDP in 2011 and further to 4 1/4% of GDP in 2013. Amidst the still-high public deficits and very low GDP growth, government debt is set to increase from 61% of GDP at the end of 2010 to 78 of GDP in 2013.

Table II.9.1:
Main features of country forecast - SPAIN

	2010			92-07	Annual percentage change					
	bn EUR	Curr. prices	% GDP		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GDP	1051.3	100.0		3.1	0.9	-3.7	-0.1	0.7	0.7	1.4
Private consumption	606.9	57.7		3.0	-0.6	-4.3	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.1
Public consumption	221.7	21.1		3.8	5.9	3.7	0.2	-0.9	-2.6	0.3
Gross fixed capital formation	240.3	22.9		4.3	-4.7	-16.6	-6.3	-5.4	-0.3	1.3
of which : equipment	62.7	6.0		4.6	-3.2	-22.9	5.2	-0.3	0.9	1.4
Exports (goods and services)	283.9	27.0		7.6	-1.0	-10.4	13.5	8.3	3.8	4.5
Imports (goods and services)	306.2	29.1		8.4	-5.2	-17.2	8.9	1.6	1.5	3.2
GNI (GDP deflator)	1035.9	98.5		3.0	0.5	-3.3	0.7	0.8	0.6	1.3
Contribution to GDP growth :										
Domestic demand				3.6	-0.7	-6.5	-1.0	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Inventories				0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net exports				-0.5	1.5	2.8	0.9	1.8	0.7	0.4
Employment				2.3	-0.2	-6.5	-2.6	-1.0	-0.4	0.5
Unemployment rate (a)				13.3	11.3	18.0	20.1	20.9	20.9	20.3
Compensation of employees/f.t.e.				4.0	6.1	4.3	0.0	0.9	1.1	1.0
Unit labour costs whole economy				3.2	4.9	1.4	-2.6	-0.8	0.1	0.1
Real unit labour costs				-0.7	2.5	1.3	-3.0	-2.3	-1.0	-1.2
Saving rate of households (b)				-	13.5	18.5	13.9	11.8	11.7	11.2
GDP deflator				3.9	2.4	0.1	0.4	1.5	1.1	1.3
Harmonised index of consumer prices				-	4.1	-0.2	2.0	3.0	1.1	1.3
Terms of trade of goods				0.4	-2.3	5.0	-1.6	-3.4	-0.8	-0.5
Merchandise trade balance (c)				-5.0	-7.8	-4.0	-4.5	-4.2	-4.0	-3.7
Current-account balance (c)				-3.7	-9.6	-5.1	-4.5	-3.4	-3.0	-3.0
Net lending(+) or borrowing(-) vis-à-vis ROW (c)				-2.8	-9.2	-4.7	-4.0	-2.9	-2.5	-2.5
General government balance (c)				-2.1	-4.5	-11.2	-9.3	-6.6	-5.9	-5.3
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance (c)				-2.1	-4.6	-9.2	-7.0	-4.5	-4.2	-4.3
Structural budget balance (c)				-	-4.3	-8.5	-7.0	-4.9	-4.2	-4.3
General government gross debt (c)	542	40.1	53.8	61.0	69.6	73.8	78.0			

(a) Eurostat definition. (b) gross saving divided by gross disposable income. (c) as a percentage of GDP.